Actually I'd rather have such "bonkers" tests than the other extreme, like NASA not thinking about what could happen if pieces of foam from the external fuel tank impacted the Space Shuttle on launch until it was too late (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaste...).
The really shitty thing is they knew early on the O-rings were slipping and partially extruding themselves, which wasn't part of the original design. They shrugged and ignored this, which then opened the door for disaster when the O-rings behaved differently (and still wrong) when cold. If they had pumped the brakes when the initial deviation from the design was discovered, it wouldn't have ended in disaster.
"Boisjoly wrote a memo in July 1985 to his superiors concerning the faulty design of the solid rocket boosters that, if left unaddressed, could lead to a catastrophic event during launch of a Space Shuttle. Such a catastrophic event occurred six months later resulting in the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster."
Engineers objected and were ignored for the foam strike as well. What I don't know is how many engineers object, are ignored, and everything goes fine anyway. Maybe these are the only 2 times engineers objected. Maybe they get 100 objections for every launch.
That one is a classic example of normalization of deviance. They knew there were temperature limits, but they'd pushed the boundary a bit in the past with no ill results, and so began to feel complacent about the risks of pushing them even further.
