Interestingly, it's the line operator that usually has to establish and maintain those according to federal and (whatever) state guidelines might exist.
I believe that this is incorrectly simplistic, if only because these sorts of situations by definition exist at the interface between a railroad and either a private or government road. Having the line operator (which I'm taking to mean railroad owner, in this case BNSF) bear 100% of the burden of providing full crossing protection creates an unbalanced situation (in terms of the cost to be borne). I'm not an expert, but have been following a forum thread on this topic (this Amtrak-truck collision and how to prevent repeats)[0] which points to articles stating that this particular crossing has been "on the list" of not the RR owner (BNSF) but MODOT (Missouri [state] Dept of Transportation) for receiving a "crossing gates and lights" (automated protection) deployment, and that the cost of this prospective deployment is approximately USD400K (per crossing) which would be shared by the state (MODOT) and BNSF, and that, as noted by others posting in this thread, there are a large number (probably the majority) of RR/road crossings in the state (and country) which are similarly unprotected, and whose low use rate has historically not justified the installation and ongoing maintenance costs of full crossing protection. A cynic on the linked[0] thread mentioned it was possible that MODOT had put every unprotected RR/road crossing "on the list" to receive a full protection equipment deployment, so that in case of any similar accident, they could claim to "already be working on a solution, just didn't get there in time" as in bureaucratic CYA.
Given the costs involved, IMO it would probably be better to close at least half of the crossings in (e.g. relatively flat farmland) areas where the road grid incurs these crossings at a rate more than one per mile. But as with decisions to spend money, choosing which crossings to close (ostensibly so that the remainder may have automated protection added) becomes a political "hot potato" that can easily cause the process to stall.
I used to work for BNSF, I'm well aware of how those programs materialize on the private end. Sometimes states will chip in, but it's mostly on the line owner. You can't just install a crossing anymore. They're wired into national and global networks that are part of track-side overhauls. Additionally, when AMTRAK goes over BNSF lines (at least when I worked there) you don't have automated train control (which is really braking). A signal is a good first step, but if your goal is to really put a dent in these kinds of incidents then it's a lot of on-going cost - mostly born by the tail operator because they're the ones that lease access to the lines.
The situation is quite confusing. Restricting the discussion to the vast numbers of existing RR/road crossings (not new crossings), then to what degree does the state control the installation of automated crossing protection (upgrades)? The various articles I read about this crash strongly suggest that MODOT is largely throttling which RR/road crossing automated protection upgrades are executed, and implies this throttling is largely because of state spending limits. But if as you say most of the cost of these upgrades is to be borne by BNSF, why would MODOT be reluctant to compel BNSF to spend money upgrading crossing protection throughout their state? If BNSF had refused such "suggestions" by the state, I would expect to made aware, post crash, of how evil BNSF was in not performing needed safety upgrades requested/commanded by the state, how the state is suing BNSF to compel them to do so, and how BNSF is 100% liable for the damages related to this crash. But that isn't what I read in any of the articles related to this crash. This strongly suggests to me that the state bears significant, perhaps gating, responsibility here.
Any clarification of what's going on in this regard would be appreciated.
That could be specific to the state. As I said, federal and state rail commissions can exercise authority in that space, and have varying agreements state by state. The point of what I was saying is that getting a signal in place is one thing, actually having it connected up to BNSF's CTC network and integrating that into passenger trains is the more effective thing to do, and $400k sounds very short for that.
You're looking to assign blame, I'm looking to say, "How does this problem get resolved". Very different questions.
This cost sharing hot potato is itself part of the problem. It's ridiculous to have privately-owned infrequently-used tracks having precedence over well-used public roads, and then making mitigating the resulting contention into a shared responsibility. It's akin to someone putting up a yield sign on the road next to their driveway, and then just pulling out without caring because they technically own up until the center of the road.
Rather BNSF et al should be paying for the full cost of their own infrastructure, either by building out the necessary safety devices or simply ending the full-speed aspect of the crossings they don't want to pay for. And I say this as someone who like trains, has taken the Southwest Chief cross country a few times, and wishes we had more passenger rail in general.
The RR line on which the collision near Mendon, MO occurred is the furthest thing from "infrequently-used tracks"; these tracks are part of the "BNSF Southern Transcon[tinental]" line[0] between Los Angeles, CA and Chicago, IL, which carries (per previously linked Trains Forum thread: "Posted by tree68 on Thursday, June 30, 2022 7:59 PM") "The FRA/DOT crossing data shows over 50 trains a day..." (wikipedia[0] provides a higher number). And the vast majority of the BNSF Southern Transcon in MO (and elsewhere) is double-tracked, meaning trains can (and usually do) run near full track speed (90 mph in my understanding) without the frequent need to stop for opposing-direction traffic as would be typical on single-track lines.
Also, I don't know if you were applying the term to the road of the crossing involved in this crash, but this road is not one I would characterize as "well used"; more like "exceedingly rarely used" (thus the lack of active crossing protection).
Finally according to the previously referenced Trains Forum thread ("Posted by blue streak 1 on Wednesday, June 29, 2022 11:32 AM"), the railroad existed 60-70 years prior to the road in question. I believe it is this circumstance which places the onus on MODOT to defend the users of their later-arriving road from hazards associated with rail traffic on the preexisting BNSF line (with BNSF being an involved party).
I understand citing posts another public forum does not necessarily meet the gold standard of citations, but all of these facts align with my preexisting understanding of the situation.
I was talking in generalities. As I said in another comment, I'm in a more dense region where level non-gated crossings tend to be branches for factories and the like. So I've seen plenty of roads that are decorated with some train tracks (with a toss up as to whether they're even active), but still carry the nonsensical presumption that every passing vehicle should somehow have to yield to nonexistent trains going at unknown speeds.
The specific busyness of these tracks is all the more reason all crossings should be lighted/gated. And while we're at it, there should be sensors/cameras to check for stuck vehicles and communicate that to the train a few miles away - if a train going at 90mph takes 3 miles to stop, that actually means the gates only need to come down two minutes before the train gets to the crossing. But there's no impetus to proactively address such problems until the incentives are reformed.
> I believe it is this circumstance which places the onus on MODOT to defend the users of their later-arriving road from hazards associated with rail traffic on the preexisting BNSF line
Sure, but understanding the legal justification doesn't change what I said. This is an instance where the common law first-come first-serve system completely fails. See also: water "rights". It would be a different story if the tracks were also a public way and open for use by everyone, but in general private control over the commons should be rejected.
If BNSF is not already today 100% responsible for installing & maintaining maximal protection equipment at all RR/road crossings that were installed by government over its preexisting tracks,
then BNSF should have all of its property (tracks and right of way (RR track bearing real estate)) converted into "the commons" (i.e. BNSF should be nationalized)
and the owner of "the commons" (government) will then resolve all RR/road crossing safety issues (by RR closure, road closure, or deployment of crossing improvements sufficient to match safety levels attained in the country having the safest RR/road crossings in the world, at its prerogative) all while operating the new national RR (carrying freight and passengers) safely and efficiently to ensure supply line problems attributable to RR causes do not worsen.
> then BNSF should have all of its property (tracks and right of way (RR track bearing real estate)) converted into "the commons" (i.e. BNSF should be nationalized)
No, I said nothing of the sort. Many times, homeowners own the land up until the middle of the road in front of their house. But they don't have the right of way when pulling into the road, and must interact with other users of the public way in an equitable manner orthogonal to ownership. I'm advocating something similar for owners of railroad tracks, whereby trains don't automatically get the right of way, but rather track owners are responsible for doing improvements to mediate contention if they want trains to travel through intersections at speed. The default state of an uncontrolled level crossing should result in lack of speed rather than lack of safety.
