> brain underweighs evidence from new experiences in favor of pre-existing [...] prior assumptions.
Isn't this what brains do typically, outside of depression?
I omitted the word "negative" from the quote as that part I don't think is universal. It still seems a somewhat limited modifier in modelling depression.
The linked article's paragraph on "lumping together depression and trauma" also seems to accidentally expand on this conflation. I understand the causes of depression are likely numerous, so natural tendencies of those not prone to depression can't be ruled out as contributory factors, but I'm not sure I see an argument there for their being significant.
> I omitted the word "negative" from the quote as that part I don't think is universal.
For a definition of "depression", it is. If somebody always believes that everything is great, regardless of the evidence, that might be a problem, but that problem would not be called "depression".
> Isn't this what brains do typically, outside of depression?
No; the theory is that typical brains do a certain amount of consideration of new evidence, and depressed brains do less than that.
The same article goes on to point out that there must be more to it, since as described this model would still result in depression naturally clearing up.
Isn't this what brains do typically, outside of depression?
I omitted the word "negative" from the quote as that part I don't think is universal. It still seems a somewhat limited modifier in modelling depression.
The linked article's paragraph on "lumping together depression and trauma" also seems to accidentally expand on this conflation. I understand the causes of depression are likely numerous, so natural tendencies of those not prone to depression can't be ruled out as contributory factors, but I'm not sure I see an argument there for their being significant.