Regarding qualifications: I spent years building secure technology (publication platforms, websites) for whistleblowers including Ed Snowden himself (I built his official website (https://edwardsnowden.com) for the Courage Foundation (his official defence fund) plus the tech behind it that supports it. This allows our editors to submit anonymously to the site through the Tor network.
I used cryptographic software as an end-user for many years, like GPG for instance, and agree that it's hard, and we need to train people to use correct security habits (infosec and opsec), to minimise exposure to hostile elements.
I've tought at cryptoparties and other events, I have spoken to many intelligence whistleblowers, some of which I consider to be close friends, and they've told me about some of the techniques used on the national intelligence agency level and how wrong use of crypto and general bad operational security practices can expose you. So while I'm not a trained cryptographer, and do not claim to be, I have extensive experience not only building secure software, but also, thanks to whistleblowers know about some of the ins and outs of the intelligence industry re crypto and surveillance.
You really shouldn't have to show credentials. If tpateck had cared, he could easily have looked them up. And besides, arguments should stand on their own without credentials. Our hacker space recently defined a hacker ethos: one of the first things was that credentials or certificates or something don't matter.
True, they are rare. On another unrelated project I'm working together with Bill Binney, the cryptographer who wrote ThinThread at NSA. That's all I can currently say about it.
I used cryptographic software as an end-user for many years, like GPG for instance, and agree that it's hard, and we need to train people to use correct security habits (infosec and opsec), to minimise exposure to hostile elements.
I've tought at cryptoparties and other events, I have spoken to many intelligence whistleblowers, some of which I consider to be close friends, and they've told me about some of the techniques used on the national intelligence agency level and how wrong use of crypto and general bad operational security practices can expose you. So while I'm not a trained cryptographer, and do not claim to be, I have extensive experience not only building secure software, but also, thanks to whistleblowers know about some of the ins and outs of the intelligence industry re crypto and surveillance.